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McDermott: Statutory Rape: Previous Chaste Character in Florida

NOTES
STATUTORY RAPE: PREVIOUS CHASTE CHARACTER
IN FLORIDA
Carnal intercourse with a female below the age of ten constituted
the crime of rape at common law irrespective of the victim's consent.1
Above that age a young girl was considered capable of valid consent,
and intercourse with her was not a crime.2 In order to protect young
women, numerous states have created statutory crimes eliminating
consent as a defense to an act of intercourse with females below
certain ages. 3 Although the statutes have raised the age of consent
above ten years, penalties imposed under the statutory crimes do not

approach the severe sanctions of common law rape4 or forcible rape
statutes.

5

Section 794.05 of Florida Statutes 1959, commonly termed "statutory rape,", provides:
"Any person who has unlawful carnal intercourse with any
unmarried person, of previous chaste character, who at the time
of such intercourse is under the age of eighteen years, shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more
than ten years, or by fine of not exceeding two thousand
dollars."
While the statute is an extension of common law rape with
118 Eliz. c. 7, §4 (1576); see 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628 (1736).
2But see discussion, 1 HALE, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 730-71. Lord Coke implied
that consent negated a charge of rape above age 10; Hale felt that 12 was the age
age of consent and that Coke's definition was erroneous.
3E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §10-4201 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. §698.1 (1950); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 130, §11 (1954).
41 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 627 (1736) (death penalty and, at a later date, castration and loss of eyes, though sometimes only imprisonment when suit was
brought by the king).
(death or imprisonment); MINN. STAT. ANN.
5E.g., FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1959)
§617.01 (1947) (7 to 30 years); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §585:16 (1955) (up to 30
years).
oFLA. STAT. §794.01 (1959), which is a statutory adoption of common law
rape, is referred to as forcible rape, or the capital crime of rape, to distinguish
it from §794.05.

[201]
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respect to the age of consent, it varies the elements of the capital
crime by use of the words previous chaste character. This phrase is
a condition to conviction for the statutory crime. If the victim was
not of previous chaste character, the defendant did not commit statutory rape.
The first Florida statute prohibiting intercourse with unmarried
females under a certain age made no reference to the chastity of the
victim.7 This statute underwent some changes with respect to age
and the seriousness of the crime 9 until 1915, when the legislature
added the requirement that the victim be of "previous chaste character."10 The statute was further amended in 1921 by replacing the
words "any unmarried female" with "any unmarried person."'1 Although there have been no reported cases involving male victims, the
Florida Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the 1921 amendment was to protect male or female victims of previously chaste
character.1 2- The statute has been re-enacted without change since
1921.
PREVIOUS CHASTE CHARACTER As AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME

FloridaDefinition
The Florida Supreme Court has been explicit in defining the
3
words previous chaste character. In Lowe v. State the Court stated:1
"The clause in the statute, supra, 'of previous chaste
character,' does not mean purity of mind, nor purity of heart,
but purity of body - i.e. that the prosecutrix had never sustained illicit relations with any one prior to the alleged offense
with the defendant."
The Court, in Williams v. State, quoted the following passage from
Words and Phrases as the acceptable definition of the phrase:"4
71Fla. Laws 1887, ch. 3760.
SFla. Laws 1901, ch. 4965, §1 (from age 16 to 18).
9FLA. REV. STAT. §2598 (1892) (misdemeanor); Fla. Laws 1901, ch. 4965, §1
(felony).
'OFIa. Laws 1915, ch. 6974, §1.
"Fla. Laws 1921, ch. 8596, §1.
12Blount v. State, 102 Fla. 1100, 138 So. 2 (1931).
13154 Fla. 730, 733, 19 So.2d 106, 108 (1944).
1492 Fla. 125, 127, 109 So. 305, 306 (1926).
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"'Chaste' is defined as meaning 'pure from all unlawful
commerce of the sexes'; applied to persons before marriage, it
signifies pure from all sexual intercourse. Previous chaste
character, as used in the law in cases of this kind, means 'actual
personal virtue and not reputation.'"
A much broader definition was given in Deas v. State, although
the statement was unnecessary to the decision: "her undefiled virginity, prior to her initial indulgence with the defendant . ... ",,5
This is misleading because virginity and chastity are not synonymous.
Virginity is lost by any act of intercourse, while chastity is lost only
by an illicit act of intercourse. Thus it has been held that a widowo
or a victim of forcible rape 7 is not rendered unchaste by intercourse.
The victim of a statutory rape could not ordinarily be considered
chaste to subsequent actors, for it would make the words previous
chaste character meaningless.
Burden of Proof on the State
Before a defendant can be convicted of statutory rape, the state
must allege and prove beyond a reasonable doubt the prior chastity
of the prosecutrix. In Dallas v. State, s the first Supreme Court interpretation of the words previous chaste character, the trial court
had charged that chastity of the female was presumed. The Court
reversed, holding that by the addition of the words the legislature
created an essential element of the crime, which the state must allege
and prove. In rejecting a rule that presumes chastity, the Court felt
that such a presumption would destroy the greater presumption of
innocence which operates in favor of a defendant in a criminal case
and force him to prove his innocence. A second reason for rejecting
the presumption of chastity had an unusual policy as its basis:19
"What has been said by some courts about an unchaste
female in our country being a comparatively rare exception
is no doubt true where the population is composed largely of
15119 Fla. 839, 842, 161 So. 729, 730 (1935).
16State v. Eddy, 40 S.D. 390, 167 N.V. 392 (1918).
"7Hickman v. State, 137 Tex. Cr. App. 616, 132 S.W.2d 598 (1939).
1876 Fla. 358, 79 So. 690 (1918).
igld. at 364, 79 So. at 691.
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the Caucasian race, but we would blind ourselves to actual
conditions if we adopted this rule where another race that is
largely unmoral constitutes an appreciable part of the population."
Several states agree with Florida that chastity must be alleged and
proved by the prosecution,'20 but most states with a similar statute
presume chastity and require the defendant to present unchastity as
an affirmative defense.21 Even when chastity is not an element of
the crime, lack of chastity may be admissible under ordinary rules
of evidence to mitigate the penalty,2 2 or to discredit the prosecutrix's
testimony by showing that her pregnancy may have been caused by
someone other than the defendant23 or that she is shielding others
by prosecuting the defendant.2- Such evidence does not amount to
a defense, as it would under statutes using the words previous chaste
character. Her bad character is immaterial when chastity is not an
issue,2 5 except for impeachment or mitigation. Williams v. State is
an example of evidence sufficient to prove actual chastity. The Court
2
stated: 6
"The witness having testified that no one else had ever had
sexual intercourse with her, this was proof of previous chaste
character in the manner in which the law contemplates that
personal chastity -actual character-shall be proven."
In a later case, Deas v. State,27 the Court stated by way of dictum
that when the defense rests on a denial of the act of intercourse,
proof of the previous chaste character of the prosecuting witness is
only technically required, "like proof of venue." This is consistent
with the Williams doctrine. But in Howell v. State2 8 the majority
20E.g., Larson v. State, 125 Neb. 789, 252 N.W. 195 (1934); Humphrey v. State,

34 Okla. Cr. 247, 246 Pac. 486 (1926).
21E.g., Smith v. State, 188 Miss. 339, 194 So. 922 (1940); Benton %. State, 158
Tenn. 273, 12 S.W.2d 946 (1929); Williams v. State, 105 Tex. Crim. 381,
SAV.205 (1926).
L2State v. Thompson, 289 SAV.788 (Mo. 1926).

288

-3State v. Kraus, 175 Minn. 174, 220 N.W. 547 (1928).
24State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110

(1936).

"5State v. Armijo, 64 N.M. 431, 329 P.2d 785
2692 Fla. 125, 127, 109 So. 305, 306 (1926).
27119 Fla. 839, 161 So. 729 (1935).
28121 Fla. 327, 163 So. 691 (1935).

(1958).
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opinion summarily reversed the conviction and held that the state's
evidence of previous chaste character was unsatisfactory. The dissent
by Justice Buford 29 indicated that both the mother and the father of
the victim testified to her chaste character. The victim testified, but
it does not appear whether the state specifically asked her if she had
prior relations that would have rendered her unchaste. On crossexamination of the prosecutrix and other state's witnesses, the defendant's counsel brought out the facts that the prosecutrix, who was
thirteen, knew about the "possibility" of intercourse and knew of
the "instrumentalities" used for intercourse, that she had been committed to an industrial school after the act, and that the defendant
had told a police officer that he did not think he was the first person
to have intercourse with her. Justice Buford pointed out that the
facts did not establish lack of chastity. It is unfortunate that the
majority of the Court did not give reasons for holding that the state
failed to meet the burden of proof. Perhaps the majority decision
could have been justified if the victim had not testified to her
chastity, but the dissent, by citing the Williams decision, at least implied that she did. By reversing the conviction, in which the prosecutrix testified to her chastity and the defendant offered evidence
amounting only to insinuations of unchastity, the Court seems to
have been overruling a factual issue decided by the jury and merely
tabbing it "insufficient in law" in order to reach a particular result.
The Williams case will provide the prosecution with a guide in
establishing prior chastity, but the Howell case may be an appellate
cloud hovering over a conviction in which the defendant brings out
any evidence of unchastity by cross-examination or through his own
witnesses. If the Howell dissent gave all pertinent facts, there seems
to have been no legal error in the trial court's decision.
Reformation
Florida has not ruled on whether a female once unchaste can by
her subsequent conduct regain her chastity. In an early Iowa seduction prosecution 0 the court held that a female could be considered
reformed, since she had discontinued acts for about one year and then
resumed an illicit relationship with the defendant. Michigan has a

291d. at 364, 79 So. at 691.
3OState v. Moore, 78 Iowa 494, 43 N.W. 273 (1889).
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variation of the Iowa rule in that when a reasonable time has elapsed
between acts with the defendant, the female is presumed to have reformed.3 1 The specific holding was that the acts were so close in
point of time that the state was given the burden of showing reformation on retrial. It is felt that Florida would not accept a reformation
rule because of language in certain Florida cases implying that once
a female loses her chastity by the initial act she will thereafter be unchaste.3 - At best, reformation is a fiction that dilutes the strength of the
defense of prior unchaste character. If a legislature sees fit to allow a
defense of unchastity, the courts ought not to engage in a fictional
restoration of the flower of maidenhood. Reformation in morals and
reformation in law should be sharply delineated when it is sought
to punish a man for an act in which the fault of the female plays
some part.
TIME OF THE ACT

Within the Statute of Limitations and Within the Jurisdiction
Florida's statute of limitations applying to crimes not punishable
by death requires that a crime be prosecuted within two years of the
commission of the offense 33 Ordinarily, if the state proves that the
crime was committed within this period, the defendant may be convicted even though the indictment or information specifies a date
of commission other than that proved on trial.34 In an early statutory rape prosecution, Bynum v. State,3 5 however, the Court held that
the prosecutrix, who had admitted initial and subsequent acts of
intercourse with the defendant just six months before the date
charged in the indictment, was unchaste as to the defendant. As a
result of this holding a defendant could rely upon his own wrong as
a defense to the crime alleged unless the state charged him with the
initial act that deprived the prosecutrix of her chastity. This indefensible precedent was overruled several years later in Hunter v.
State.3 6 The defendant's first act of intercourse with the prosecutrix
31People v. Clark, 33 Mich. 112 (1876).
3-Capps v. State, 98 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1957); Deas v. State, 119 Fla. 839, 161 So.
729 (1935); Hunter v. State, 85 Fla. 91, 95 So. 115 (1923).
33FLA. STAT. §932.05 (1959).

3'Straughter v. State, 83 Fla. 683, 92 So. 569 (1922).
376 Fla. 618, 80 So. 572 (1918).
3685 Fla. 91, 95 So. 115 (1923).
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was in June, 1921. The indictment charged that the act took place
on September 15, 1921, and that the prosecutrix had been of previous
chaste character. The prosecutrix testified that she had relations with
the defendant about twenty-five times before that date within the
jurisdiction. The Court, in overruling the Bynum case in so far as
it was inconsistent, held that a date different from that alleged in
the indictment and within the statute of limitations could be proved
as the date on which the crime was committed. The Court held that
the particular time of an illicit act is not of material importance and
that prior acts with the defendant within the period of limitations
do not render the female unchaste as to him. This approach will not
allow the state to be defeated for such an unimportant procedural
defect, and the defendant will not be allowed to hide behind his
earlier wrongful acts of intercourse with the prosecutrix.
Within the Statute of Limitations but Outside
the Jurisdiction
Although the Hunter case permitted conviction when the defendant and the prosecutrix engaged in illicit relations within the
statute of limitations and within the jurisdiction, State v. Capps37
held otherwise when the initial act took place in another jurisdiction.
The information alleged that the defendant and the prosecutrix committed an unlawful act of intercourse on December 25, 1955, in Escambia County, Florida, and that the prosecutrix had no intercourse
with anyone but the defendant for one year prior to December 25,
the initial act taking place in Virginia. The Supreme Court, without
discussion, held that the Hunter case cannot "logically" be considered
as authority for a conviction when the defendant has had previous
intercourse with the prosecutrix in another jurisdiction. Under the
theory of the Hunter case, an indictment charging a subsequent act
of intercourse relates back to the initial act, and the defendant is
actually tried for the initial violation of chastity that took place within
the statute of limitations and within the jurisdiction. In effect, the
initial act renders a female unchaste.
Carrying the Capps case to its logical extreme, the question might
be asked whether a defendant could be convicted by showing that
he committed the initial act within the two-year statute of limitations
but in a county other than that alleged in the indictment or the in3798 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1957).
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formation. Both the Capps and the Hunter cases show that a defendant can be convicted only when the trial court can take jurisdiction over the initial act of illicit intercourse. Florida has not
answered the question with regard to statutory rape, but has held
that a defendant cannot be convicted of kidnapping by showing that
he committed the crime anywhere other than in the county shown
in the indictment. 3s Florida further gives a defendant a constitutional
right to trial in the county in which the offense is committed.3 9
Within the Jurisdiction but Outside the Statute of Limitations
Florida has not expressly ruled that when the initial act between
the defendant and the prosecutrix is beyond the statute of limitations
the female will be considered unchaste. The strong implications of
the Capps and Hunter cases, however, make the conclusion inescapable that the female would be considered unchaste even though she
had never had intercourse with anyone but the defendant. The
reasoning of the Florida Court seems to prevent conviction for any
act other than the initial taking of chastity. If that act were barred
by the statute of limitations the Court would be prevented from
asserting jurisdiction over the cause. In Lowe v. State40 the prosecutrix admitted acts with the defendant prior to the statute of limitations, but the dissent emphasized that the female was under the age
41
of ten at that time and such acts would constitute the crime of rape.
If those acts had rendered the female unchaste, it is submitted that
the majority of the court would not have granted a new trial but
rather would have entered a verdict for the defendant.
Bynum and Hunter imply that a female is unchaste when the
initial act takes place beyond the statute of limitations. The Bynum
case, which held that any act prior to that alleged in the indictment
renders a female unchaste, was overruled only in so far as it was inconsistent with Hunter. Since Hunter permits conviction for the initial act within the jurisdiction and within the statute of limitations,
it is reasonable to conclude that Bynum still stands as authority for
the rule that any act committed prior to the statute of limitations
renders the female unchaste.
38Barber v. Statc, 13 Fla. 675 (1869).
3FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights §11.

40154 Fla. 730, 19 So.2d 106 (1944).
411d. at 737, 19 So.2d at 110.
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EVIDENCE OF UNCHASTE CHARACTER

Denial and Unchastity
Howell v. State allows a defendant to give evidence of unchastity
even though his defense is based on a complete denial of the act
charged. Howell testified to acts that would indicate unchastity, and
also denied the act with which he was charged. Although Justice
Buford, dissenting,42 felt that the defendant should not be allowed
to show unchastity when it was not a matter of defense, it is submitted that in reversing and remanding the case for a new trial, the
Court recognized that both denial and assertions of unchastity of
the prosecutrix are acceptable defenses in the same case, even though
the defendant does not plead unchastity. The defendant in Ward v.
State43 also used both defenses.
Specific Acts of Intercourse by the Prosecutrixwith Others
Specific acts of intercourse with others are definitely within the
contemplation of a defense based on the unchastity of the prosecutrix.4 4 This rule is accepted in all jurisdictions that have statutes
similar to that of Florida.45 It would indeed be unreasonable to refuse proof of violation of a girl's chastity when such evidence is a
direct contradiction of an element necessary for conviction. Pennsylvania's statute uses the words of good repute,46 and it has been held
that specific acts of intercourse are not admissible because the words
refer to the reputation of the female in the community and not to
the true state of her chastity.4 This ruling is consistent with a
technical definition of repute.
An interesting question arises under the statute when the prosecutrix loses her chastity to one party and immediately thereafter has
intercourse with another. Is the prosecutrix rendered unchaste as to
42121 Fla. 327, 328, 163 So. 691 (1935).
43149 Fla. 107, 5 So.2d 59 (1941).
44E.g., Hickman v. State, 97 So.2d 37 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1957); Ward v. State,
supra note 43.
4-Moya v. People, 79 Colo. 104, 244 Pac. 69 (1926); Taylor v. State, 165 Tenn.
156, 53 S.W.2d 377 (1932); Williams v. State, 105 Tex. Crim. 381, 288 S.W. 205
(1926).
46PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4721 (1945).

47Commonwealth v. Sutton, 171 Pa. Super, 105, 90 A.2d 264 (1952).
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the second person because of her initial act with the first? In Coots
v. State48 the Texas Supreme Court held that the female was unchaste
as to the second person even though the acts followed closely in point
of time. The decision was technically correct under the statute because the victim could hardly regain her chastity in such a short time
without benefit of a fiction. The court specifically stated, however,
that the defendant might be convicted on the basis of participation as
an accessory or principal for the initial act by his friend. In Alford
v. State4 9 the Florida Court upheld conviction of several defendants
as principals and accessories before the fact of an attempt to have
unlawful intercourse with the female victim. Whether the Florida
Court would take a stand similar to the issue presented in the Texas
case is not known, but in preparing an indictment prosecutors should
be on guard to relate it to the initial act of intercourse.
Immoral Acts Other Than Intercourse
Florida has generally admitted evidence of immoral conduct of
the prosecutrix when it has a bearing on her chaste character. It
would be extremely difficult for a defendant to prove that a prosecutrix actually engaged in sexual intercourse with another, so it is
entirely proper to bring in circumstantial evidence of specific acts
of bad conduct from which the jury may draw an inference as to her
actual unchastity.
In Dallas v. State5° the following questions were excluded at the
trial level:
"Q. Have you ever seen this girl in any act of familiarity
with any man in the last six months?
------------ 1 sitting on the
"Q. Have you seen this girl
lap of any man during February or March of this year?"
These questions do not necessarily relate to specific acts of intercourse
but do relate to specific acts of bad character. The Court granted a
48110 Tex. Crim. 105, 7 S.W.2d 539 (1928).
49132 Fla. 624, 181 So. 839 (1938).
5076 Fla. 358, 79 So. 690 (1918).
51FLA. STAT. §794.03 (1959) prohibits publication of the name of a rape victim.
It is probably applicable to a statutory rape victim, but perhaps publication in
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new trial, holding that the questions were proper as showing lack of
chastity or impugning her chastity: 52
to introduce evidence
"[I]t is proper for the defendant .
that the prosecutrix had, prior to the alleged act of carnal
intercourse with the defendant associated with persons of low
morals, conducted herself in a free and intimate manner with
men, or permitted them to take liberties with her."
In Thomas v. State53 the Court excluded evidence tending to show
that the prosecutrix was a person of low morals and indulged in
loose conduct with men. The ground for exclusion was that the
evidence was indefinite as to times and terms. It seems that this rule
conflicts somewhat with the rule in the Dallas case, in which the
questions were indefinite. The Thomas case does not show just what
evidence was offered, but it would probably be admissible even if indefinite as to time and terms, if phrased as a question about the girl's
reputation.
The Florida Court has also admitted testimony of a mother who
found her daughter in bed with a soldier,54 a letter from the prosecutrix to a "boy friend" inviting him to visit her,55 and proof that the
prosecutrix had contracted a venereal disease before she was eleven. 56
The Dallas decision stands firmly for the proposition that evidence
of particular acts of bad conduct are admissible when they have a
bearing on the female's chastity. This is to be distinguished from
the burden placed upon the state to prove that the female is in fact
chaste. Williams v. State implies that circumstantial evidence of her
chastity might not sustain the state's burden. It is extremely doubtful that the state could prove chastity by showing only prior good
acts of the prosecutrix. Such evidence would be of slight probative
value in establishing the actual fact of chastity. Although the Williams
case shows that a testimonial assertion by the victim is sufficient to
show previous chaste character, it is submitted that her testimony
should also be a minimum acceptable standard of proof. The imposition of dual standards of proof would be a commendable interprelegal reporter systems is an exception.
Fla. at 361, 79 So. at 690.
Fla. 332, 141 So. 145 (1932).
54Hickman v. State, 97 So.2d 37 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
-Dallas v. State, 76 Fla. 358, 79 So. 690 (1918).
sGNard v. State, 149 Fla. 107, 5 So.2d 59 (1941).
5276

53105
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tation of the Florida statute.
burden of proof on the state.

It would properly place a heavier

Reputation Evidence
Impeachment. When the prosecutrix takes the stand to testify
to her prior chastity the defendant is permitted to introduce evidence of her general unchaste reputation. The Court in Deas v.
State57 held that such rebuttal evidence was admissible as affecting
the veracity of the female's testimony that she was of chaste character.
While the defendant appeared to base his defense on prior unchastity,
evidence of repute was admitted on the ground that it would impeach
the witness' reputation for truth and veracity rather than as a formal
defense. Since lack of chastity is a defense to the crime, does not the
admission of general reputation evidence perform the function of
a defense under the statute if the jury does not believe that the
witness is telling the truth about her chaste character? Since the
state will probably be forced to ask the prosecutrix to take the stand
in order to sustain its burden of proof, the defendant should have an
opportunity to bring forth any evidence of the female's bad reputation.
Ordinarily, the "reputation" referred to when a witness is impeached means reputation for truth and veracity in the community 8
rather than for chastity. Certainly an unchaste female might be
reliable for truthfulness in some cases, but when the female is a
prosecutrix on a charge of statutory rape and conviction depends upon her assertion of chastity, general reputation for unchastity definitely
bears upon her reliability to tell the truth on that issue.
Proof of Unchaste Character. Some Florida cases appear to have
admitted reputation evidence to prove unchastity inferentially rather
than to impeach the prosecutrix. Although the state probably could
not meet its burden by reputation evidence5 9 it seems fair to allow
the defendant to prove character by use of the girl's reputation for
morality. Reputation evidence of unchaste character was admitted
in Ward v. State, in which the defendant showed that the female "was
brought up and lived in an environment of lewdness and adulterous
57119 Fla. 839, 161 So. 729 (1935).
58State v. Ternan, 32 Wash. 2d 584, 203 P.2d 342 (1949).
59See Williams v. State, 92 Fla. 125, 109 So. 305 (1926).
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cohabitation which obtained among some of her associates .. .
The Court in Hickman v. State also approved of evidence of the
general moral reputation of the girl as a rebuttal to chastity. Although the issue in Dallas v. State related to specific acts of immoral
conduct, the Court quoted from a New York case in support of acceptance of character evidence:6 1
"'But I think the defense is not confined to cases of actual
incontinency, but may prevail upon the ground of reputation
alone, and that if the jury find the female really had the reputation of being unchaste, the case is not within the statute.
The use of the word 'character' is important in this respect,
and in such case she does not come within the class described
in the act, although illicit intercourse, in fact, can not be
proved.' "
Thus Florida courts have prcperly permitted reputation evidence
in statutory rape prosecutions under an impeachment rule or as a
matter of formal defense. A distinction between evidence to impeach
and a formal defense should be noted. Admission of reputation
evidence to impeach is dependent upon the prosecutrix taking the
witness stand. The same evidence may enter as a defense regardless
of whether the prosecutrix testifies. This distinction will not be important in most cases because the victim's testimony will probably
be necessary to establish corpus delicti and her prior chastity.
CONCLUSION

Should a female's chastity be an element of statutory rape? It is
felt that the legislature has dealt sensibly with a difficult problem.
It is not always justifiable to punish a male as a felon for succumbing
to the lures of an immoral, underage female. The words previous
chaste character allow the female's immorality to be raised as a
defense. States refusing to accept chastity as an issue in this crime
overlook the maturity and fault of some young women. As a preventive measure, it is doubtful that the statute would cause a defendant to give much consideration to the victim's chastity before
consummating an act. Conviction of one who steals the flower of
60149 Fla. 107, 108, 5 So.2d 59, 60 (1947).

6176 Fla. 358, 861, 79 So. 690 (1918).
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